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Introduction
'Enlarging the EU has taken a back seat as members grapple with problems closer to home.' 1 While this may seem like a contemporary statement about European Union (EU) enlargement in times of crisis, it is nonetheless how the editor of the Financial Times, Lionel Barber, summarized the situation in the mid-1990s. Although the EU was generally committed to opening its gates to the East back then, it was careful not to encourage the central and east European countries to push for membership (see also Mattli and Plümper 2002) . Indeed, Barber goes on by quoting a senior Commission official saying the '[EU's current] level of seriousness about enlargement is not minimal, it simply does not exist.'
This episode illustrates that enlargement historically stems from the pressure of countries that aspire to join, not from an expansionist ambition on the EU's side.
Moreover, it emphasizes that the desirability of enlargement and its potentially destabilizing effects have been subject to heated debates since the earliest days of the European Communities (O'Brennan 2014, 223f) . And yet, parallel to its institutional deepening, the EU widened significantly from originally six members to 28 by 2017.
This raises key analytical and empirical questions that this article seeks to address:
what would be an adequate baseline model for predicting candidate countries' ability to comply with EU law? And, against previous and on-going enlargement experiences, how likely is it that a candidate would be ready or able to join over the next decade(s)?
EU enlargement policy is path-dependent due to the self-reinforcing nature of a series of sequenced decisions and, hence, rather difficult to reverse (Vachudova 2005; Giandomenico 2009; Szymański 2013) . The institutional architecture of EU 1 'Brussels keeps shut the gates to the East' (Lionel Barber), Financial Times (November 16, 1995), 17. enlargement policy with its hybrid nature adds to this rigidity. Each member state has, in theory, the possibility to veto at multiple stages. Yet, enlargement cannot take place without the approval of central EU institutions, notably the European Parliament and the Commission. These supranational institutions are strongly committed to 'the firm prospect of EU membership ' (European Commission 2016) . Moreover, the standardized procedure also obliges them to consider all applications from European countries according to the same standards. This rigid architectural design of EU enlargement policy allows us to presume a certain continuity against which we can assess a candidate country's ability to comply. That is, if EU enlargement policy is generally consistently linked to compliance in the target countries (Szymański 2013; Schimmelfennig 2008) and it is, then and primarily, properties of candidate countries that explain variance in compliance ability, models on candidates' past compliance can, in principle, accurately predict and forecast their future ability to comply.
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Drawing on previous statistical accounts of candidate countries' compliance with EU accession requirements (notably, Hille and Knill 2006; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008; Toshkov 2008; Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010; Böhmelt and Freyburg 2013; 2015) , we consider a set of core exogenous predictors to construct a baseline model for the forecast. We examine the predictive power of this model via in-sample and out-of-sample techniques, including a four-fold cross-validation exercise. Finally, after having demonstrated that prediction accuracy is given and that we are able to improve upon a naïve approach, we forecast five current and potential EU candidate countries' (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of (FYR)
Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey) compliance levels with the EU acquis communautaire until 2050.
Over the past few decades, the literature has developed influential theoretical frameworks that shed light on the underlying mechanisms of candidate states' compliance with the EU acquis, and has empirically tested these frameworks.
However, the empirical evidence is often conducted ex-post on observed data. Despite important insights, there are key limitations associated with these kinds of empirical studies. As Ward et al. (2010, 364) forcefully remind us, policy prescriptions cannot be 'based on statistical summaries of probabilistic models.' Hence, drawing inferences based on statistical significance testing alone might be misleading and not inform us about the (predictive) power of an empirical model (see also Hegre et al. 2017) . While statistically significant results may improve our understanding of the relationship between variables in each sample under study, they could not provide information on the exact same relationship in another, i.e., new sample of data -like the future. Prediction and forecasting methods can help address these shortcomings.
In the words of Schneider et al. (2010, 1) : 'anticipating the future is both a social obligation and intellectual challenge that no scientific discipline can escape,' while predictive power is usually regarded as the 'gold standard' for assessing the quality of explanatory models in most disciplines, including the social sciences (Goertz 2006 Overall, we therefore seek to contribute to both the academic and the policyoriented literature. First, our work provides an assessment when current and potential candidates might be ready for EU membership in light of their ability to adjust to the acquis, if at all, through systematic research based on information on the previous, current, and potential candidates' levels of compliance. Since earlier work has paid little attention to predicting and forecasting states' ability to implement EU law, policymakers lack guidance for assessing the success of EU enlargement politics and, hence, making an informed statement on potential readiness of candidates for future accessions.
Second, we develop a model that enables forecasts of candidate countries' compliance levels, i.e., their ability to comply with the acquis that future research can easily rely on, verify, and extend. Specifically, we predict candidate states' compliance levels in the future after having determined that our set of exogenous factors (including fixed effects) predicts accurately observed compliance patterns with genuine in-sample and out-of-sample techniques. However, neither is the predictive model in t based on data in t nor do we use earlier compliance patterns to forecast compliance in the future (for a discussion of the importance on this, see, e.g., Desmarais and Cranmer 2013) . To this end, we provide a comprehensive discussion 3 Having said that, it should be kept in mind that prediction differs from explanation. In the words of Hegre et al. (2017, 115) : '[w]hen evaluating the relationship between prediction and explanation it is important to recognize the different purposes of forecasting. Forecasting can help researchers to test, improve, and build their theories. However, forecasting not only fulfils scientific objectives; it also enables policymakers to formulate evidence-based policies regarding peace and security issues.
Forecasts can help designing polices or act merely as an early-warning tool.' of the conceptualization of compliance used, the specifications of the explanatory variables identified in earlier work, and, most crucially, previous findings. As we provide clear guidelines for prediction exercises in general, we also seek to contribute to the 'forecasting literature' in EU politics (Thomson and Hosli 2006; Bechtel and Leuffen 2010) and to enrich the debate on the validity of policies based on empirical models (Goldstone et al. 2010; Schneider et al. 2011; Ward et al. 2010 (Szymański 2013; Schimmelfennig 2008) . Moreover, it appears that as the process unfolds, and a country is 'administratively put under the responsibility of DG Enlargement' (Giandomenico 2009, 111) , an ultimate rejection of accession becomes increasingly unlikely (see Böhmelt and Freyburg 2013, 267) . Hence, amidst economic and political crises, enlargement policy appears to be 'running on autopilot.' Year after year, 'EU member states continue to make choices […] that keep the enlargement process going' (Vachudova 2014, 123) . In short, considering the remarkable continuity of EU enlargement policy and its reactive nature, 'revolutionary changes' are unlikely to happen.
Of course, the idea of path dependency does not preclude the possibility of institutional or policy changes in the unlikely event of random and unexpected events ('exogenous shocks'), provided they are sequenced correctly (Thelen and Steinmo 1992 quality of democracy or democratic governance in candidate states (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008; Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010) and those seeking to explain variation in the extent to which these countries implemented the acquis prior to accession (Hille and Knill 2006; Toshkov 2008; Böhmelt and Freyburg 2013; 2015) .
We focus on the latter strand, especially the work by Hille and Knill (2006) as well as Böhmelt and Freyburg (2013; 2015) since they share a similar research interest and measure compliance the same way as we do (discussed below). Adopting a rationalist perspective, complemented with managerialists' insights, these studies concentrate on a country's relevant domestic actors' ability, and also partly their willingness, to adopt EU rules and adapt the corresponding national legislation.
Despite the substantive similarities, however, existing studies vary regarding research designs and findings. The empirical analyses differ in country years, with
Hille and Knill (2006) Commission regular reports for gross domestic product per capita. It seems that the extent to which the relationship between candidates' levels of compliance and the theoretically derived determinants of effective conditionality is statistically significant in regression models considerably varies, too, as shown in the appendix.
The appendix lists the covariates included in the models and indicates whether a significant negative All three studies confirm that conditionality is the main force driving candidates' compliance with the EU acquis. However, Hille and Knill (2006, 549) demonstrate that 'the functioning and the quality of the domestic bureaucracy constitute crucial preconditions. ' Böhmelt and Freyburg (2015) add that candidate states may free ride on the compliance efforts of others, and their 2013 study reports that, independently from country and EU-level conditions, the leverage of conditionality varies over the pre-accession process. The question remains whether existing explanatory models are also suited to predict compliance ability of candidate states.
As indicated above, Ward et al. (2010), among others, emphasize that results in the form of regression coefficients may not tell us much about how candidates' compliance with EU law will develop in the future. Policy prescriptions cannot be based on statistical summaries of probabilistic models. Hypothesis testing that ignores out-of-sample heuristics faces the inherent risk of fitting to a specific sample's idiosyncrasies rather than identifying stable structural relationships between a dependent variable of interest and its determinants. In fact, if a model explains the relationship between, in our case, states' ability to comply with EU law and some explanatory factors well in-sample, we merely assume that it also performs well when presented with new data and trying to predict out-of-sample. 8 But if the model only gives a description of this relationship in the original data set without capturing underlying causal relations, the chances to make correct predictions with new data are likely to be undermined (Beck et al. 2000) . In the words of Ward et al. (2010, 364) , 'it (positive), a non-significant negative (positive), or no relationship (~zero) is reported. We distinguish between 'non-significant relationships' and 'no relationship,' as statistical significance does not equal substantive significance. In small samples, for instance, the lack of statistical significance might obscure a substantively important relationship (see Toskov 2010).
is quite possible to focus on statistically significant results that are artefacts in the sense that they do not generalize beyond the specific cases studied. This happens if we focus only on statistically significant relationships and may actually hinder our ability to generalize to out-of-sample situations, such as the future!'
The following analysis seeks to address this shortcoming. We first identify the necessary variables for our model and then predict candidates' ability to comply with EU law in-sample and out-of-sample. Moving from empirical analyses based on statistical significance to prediction offers a more solid scientific basis for assessing future levels of compliance with EU accession law, which is not only highly relevant both from a policy and scholastic perspective (Bechtel and Leuffen 2010; Schneider et al. 2010; 2011) . It also allows us to analyse whether our selected model based on in-sample prediction can also accurately predict candidates' ability to comply out-ofsample, as theoretically suggested by the continuity argument.
Research Design

Empirical Strategy and Dependent Variable
Our predictions and forecasts are based on an OLS regression model that analyses data on candidate states' compliance with EU law using core exogenous predictors, which are meant to primarily proxy the costs and capabilities arguments emphasized in previous empirical studies. Our sample consists of eighteen (previous, current, and potential) candidates for which reliable data are available, as listed in the appendix.
We use the country-year as the unit of analysis, while a state drops out of the sample once the Commission does no longer provide progress reports; this happens either at the time when accession treaties are signed or at the end of the time period covered by this study (with the latest reports published in November 2016, which are included in our analysis).
To arrive at our forecast of states' compliance ability in 2017-50, we complete the following steps. First, we identify a set of potential predictors that may help us in explaining candidates' ability to comply and, thus, their compliance levels. A crucial requirement for these predictors is not only that they are exogenous to our dependent variable, but also have available high-quality projections until 2050. Clearly, not many variables meet these criteria. We follow Hegre et al. (2013) and likewise focus on a set of socio-demographic variables for which projections until 2050 exist and that can be linked to the quantitative literature on effective EU enlargement policy and, especially, previous claims about costs and capabilities. In addition, we add fixed effects for enlargement rounds and states, which then capture temporal shocks, EU policies that are specific for each enlargement rounds, or unobserved unit-level influences that affect compliance.
Second, for determining the prediction accuracy of this model, we estimate it on a time-series cross-sectional sample in 1998-2008 (N=120 country years), which we then assess with in-sample techniques. Third, we examine the out-of-sample prediction power by employing a four-fold cross-validation exercise and comparing our predictions for 2009 to 2016 (based on the estimates for the 1998-2008 period)
with observed values (for which we have data). After having assessed the prediction power of our model, and after having concluded that this power is in fact given, the final forecast for the 2017-50 period is based on a model that uses the entire set of already observed data in 1998-2016. We opted for 2050 as the final year in our forecast, as Hegre et al. (2013) , and since we have only 19 years of observed data points. We present results for the aggregated sample as well as individual countries. Figure 1 shows how we analyse the data and combine them with the statistical model to obtain our forecast of candidate states' compliance.
[ Figure 1 here]
To quantify and measure candidates' compliance with EU law, our dependent variable, we employ the updated compliance-level data from Böhmelt and Freyburg (2013; 2015) who use the EU Commission's annual reports 9 on each candidate's progress in aligning policies toward EU requirements. In these reports, the Commission explains and assesses in detail what each candidate has achieved over the last year, and identifies areas where more effort is needed to have the 'ability to assume the obligations of membership.' To this end, the acquis is divided into 30-40
(depending on the accession round) subject-related chapters. In addition to these policy sectors, each report offers a general evaluation for each country. The
Commission has been publishing these regular reports since 1998 for those countries structure as the annual progress reports, and we use this file to code the last year before Croatia's accession to the EU and include this country-year in our data set as well. The Commission reports have the advantage that their data quality is high and that they evaluate both formal and practical compliance with EU law of each candidate state on an annual basis in a standardized and comparable manner (Hille and Knill 2006, 541f) .
The final dependent variable, a country's logged degree of compliance with EU law in each policy area, is coded along the ordinal four-value assessment provided by the Commission (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2013; 2015) : the value of 0 is assigned when a country does not comply with the acquis in a specific issue area; 1 if a country partly complies with EU laws and regulations in a specific issue area, although substantially more efforts are necessary; 2 if a country almost fully complies with the acquis in a specific issue area, although more efforts are necessary; and 3 when a country fully complies with EU laws and regulations in a specific issue area. Each sector thus receives a value between 0 and 3, while higher values signify higher compliance with the acquis communautaire. Böhmelt and Freyburg (2013; 2015) then estimate the average degree of (logged) compliance for a country in each year by calculating the mean value across all policy areas plus the general evaluation and taking the natural logarithm. Focusing on the 'more general rather than issue or policy-specific' (Hille and Knill 2006, 535) performance of countries, this strategy ensures that we receive a standardized and, hence, comparable measure for all countries at different enlargement stages and rounds. Finally, note that we do, in fact, include the 2016 Commission reports, which comprise compliance patterns that are likely to be affected by populist backlashes of nationalist and populist Euro-scepticism, including the arguably most extreme change in candidate countries: the authoritarian turn in Turkey that militates against meeting the EU's political accession conditions.
Predictors
We specify a model with core explanatory variables that fulfil three criteria pivotal for our forecasting aim. First, the chosen variables are exogenous to our 'indirect measure' (Toshkov 2008 ) of compliance performance with EU accession rules based on Commission reports (or they are time-invariant). Second, they arguably proxy the costs and capabilities arguments emphasized by existing statistical studies. And, finally, good projections until 2050 are available for the time-variant items. The selected variables are a time trend, fixed effects for enlargement rounds, country fixed effects, the demographic composition of a state, infant mortality, and education (Table 1) .
[ Table 1 here]
Commonly used operationalizations and variable specifications in earlier studies may suffer from possible endogeneity with our outcome variable, candidates' compliances as reported by the Commission, for predominantly two reasons. First, the Commission stresses the need for administrative and judicial capacity to ensure correct implementation and application of the many rules next to the actual adoption of the acquis (Christoffersen 2007, 47) . Hence, dependent and core explanatory variables in previous work might conceptually overlap. Second, the expert scores used to measure some determinants of candidates' compliance might also inform the Commission's assessment of compliance with its accession rules or have been informed by its progress reports (Toshkov 2008, 382 (Hegre et al. 2013, 254) and projections for these key variables until 2050. These projections are based on national population censuses and revised in consultation with experts from national projection-making agencies every two years. We take the mean scenarios of the UN projections and complement Our first cluster of predictors seeks to proxy the domestic costs associated with compliance by a target government. A government's preferences are likely to be influenced by the extent to which the public supports EU membership and, hence, the likelihood of the public to punish potentially costly reforms in coming elections.
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Various studies on the relationship between societal characteristics, mass attitudes, and EU integration/membership, respectively, emphasize socio-economic determinants of EU support, with some groups gaining and others losing from membership. From this utilitarian perspective, an individual's expected net gain from EU membership significantly depends on her individual characteristics, notably age or education. While studies of attitudes in the then-current EU members consistently demonstrate that 'winners,' commonly the young and better educated, are more likely to have favourable EU attitudes (Gabel 1998) , the evidence for such individual-level drivers of EU support in candidate countries remains mixed (see also Börzel et al. 11 For more information on global population projections and how they are produced, see the Guide to Global Population Projections by O'Neill et al. (2001) . We also performed our calculations using the data on other UN scenarios. Our results based on these calculations do not qualitatively differ from those reported below.
12 An anonymous reviewer suggested that support for EU membership is only one factor regarding adjustment costs and that the variables we use may in fact be more related to perceived legitimacy;
First, while the latter is different from the former, the two concepts are related. Second, strong support might incline a government to accept high adjustment cost, but it does not tell us how high these costs are originally. High support reduces the net costs, but it may not serve as a (comparative) indicator of compliance costs. Note, however, that we focus on prediction rather than explanation and, thus, the specific relationship a single predictor has with the outcome variable, i.e., positive, negative, or none, does ultimately not matter. What matters is whether this predictor, as part of the full model, contributes to the prediction and forecasting power of the model, and we demonstrate this in the following sections.
2010). In fact, studies relying on the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer survey data
find only weak and cross-nationally inconsistent effects of demographic characteristics on support for EU membership (Tucker et al. 2002, 569; Tverdova and Anderson 2004) . Work using alternative data sources, namely the actual results of the referendums at the regional level, however, find that higher level of education increases the likelihood of voting in favour of EU membership (Doyle and Fidrmuc 2006) . We thus include demographic variables in our analysis, measuring age and education. The education data are taken from the Population Project at IIASA (Lutz et al. 2007 ), which uses definitions and categories consistent over countries and time to facilitate cross-national and time-series comparisons. Precisely, we employ a measure of male secondary education, defined as 'the proportion of men aged 20-24 years with secondary or higher education of all men aged 20-24' (Hegre et al. 2013, 255) . 13 The age data (Youth), in turn, come from the UN World Population Prospects series, which provides age-specific population numbers 'measured as the percentage of the population aged 15-24 years of all adults aged 15 years and above.'
As to the capabilities argument, that is a state's administrative capacity to adopt and implement EU rules (or its ability to implement adjustment efforts at the domestic level), factors such as economic development and regime type are among the explanatory variables commonly incorporated in probabilistic models of effective EU conditionality (see Böhmelt and Freyburg 2013; 2015) . However, as discussed above, these factors do not meet this study's requirements. Instead, a common measurement of state capacity in quantitative research is to look at the outcomes of public goods 13 In following Hegre et al. (2013) , we also lack data on female secondary education. However, due to our focus on relatively developed countries in Europe (unlike more developing countries outside Europe), there should be a high correlation between male and female secondary education (Breen et al. 2010 ).
and service delivery, such as the percentage of children enrolled in primary schools, infant mortality rates, or literacy rates. These measures are attractive due to their broad coverage and cross-national comparability, although not without criticism (see Hanson 2015) , because they can be attributed to factors other than state capacity, including levels of economic development and the nature of the political regime.
Since we do not test the costs and capabilities arguments against each other, but use them to identify a prediction model for candidates' future ability to comply with EU law, we do not perceive this a problem for our study. Considering this discussion, among the traditional measures of state capacity in terms of administrative performance (Bäck and Hadenius 2008) , infant mortality rates present a particularly useful composite indicator of the provision of public services (Ross 2006) . Taking the data from the UN (2007), infant mortality is defined as the probability of dying between birth and exact age one year, expressed as the number of infant deaths per 1,000 live births.
We also include a time trend, which corrects for temporal dependencies (see Böhmelt and Freyburg 2013) . Moreover, the EU has added more policy areas over the years. If the costs to comply increase, because of the addition of further policy areas, compliance might decrease. We log-transform the time-related variable Year due to a declining marginal effect on compliance with increasing time (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2013) . 14 The also model incorporates fixed effects for a specific enlargement round (i.e., 2004, 2007, and 2013) and future enlargement to account for the spatial dependencies identified in Böhmelt and Freyburg (2015) and the possibility that the specific requirements have become more difficult with each round. These dummies 14 Auffhammer and Carson (2008, 237) recommend against using year fixed effects as 'forecasting model selection criteria punish [this] quite heavily.' Instead, they suggest using a time trend variable, which is our approach.
shall further capture any time-invariant group-specific characteristics and unobserved features of each accession round's requirements, as determined by EU policy (Vachudova 2014 ).
Finally, we include country-fixed effects that are based on the same rationale at the state level, i.e., capturing unobserved time-invariant unit-level effects that may influence compliance with EU law. In light of these data and methods, particularly the inclusion of country fixed effects, we explicitly build on a 'reduced-form approach,' which assumes that due to the rigid institutional architecture of EU enlargement policy, future policy will continue to develop at roughly the historical pace (see also Schmalensee et al. 1998: 16) .
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Needless to say, predictions involve -by definition -a degree of uncertainty (see Hegre et al. 2013, 250-251) . In the following, however, we demonstrate that the predictors we include can accurately and precisely predict actually observed compliance values, i.e., that our model has little prediction error. Note here that the direction of influence or the statistical significance of the covariates does not matter for this purpose (Ward et al. 2010) : it is the precision and accuracy of our final model in making predictions that counts.
Empirical Results
In-Sample Prediction
How accurate are the 'conditional statements about a phenomenon for which the researcher actually has data, i.e., the outcome variable has been observed' ( [ Figure 2 here]
To assess the accuracy of this prediction more thoroughly, we use two goodnessof-fit measures: the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) and Theil's U (Theil 1966) , which (unlike the MSPE) does not depend on the scale of the data (see also
Bechtel and Leuffen 2010). Theil's U is the square root of the ratio between the sum of squared prediction errors of the baseline model (i.e., Model 1 in Table 2 ) and the sum of squared prediction errors of a naïve model, i.e., a 'no-change prediction'
where the level of candidate compliance with EU law in t-1 fully corresponds to the level of compliance in t. If Theil's U is larger than 1, the model performs worse than the naïve model; values for Theil's U smaller than 1 indicate that the 'theoretically informed model' performs better than the naïve specification. Moreover, the closer the MPSE is to 0, the more accurate is the model in making predictions. For our model, the MPSE is 0.0065 while Theil's U stands at 0.723.
Ultimately, therefore, the specification used in the model performs well in predicting candidate states' compliance with EU law in-sample. It remains to be seen, though, how accurately this model predicts candidate states' compliance when moving to the 'harder' test of an out-of-sample prediction confronting the model with 'new' data. Put differently, what is the model's predictive power when trying to correctly predict compliance that is not 'within the very same set of data that was used to generate the models in the first place ' (Ward et al. 2010, 8) ?
Out-of-Sample Prediction
For the out-of-sample prediction, we first use a four-fold cross-validation quasiexperimental setup that was repeated ten times for the baseline model in 1998-2008.
We refer the interested reader to Ward et al. (2010, 370) who describe this approach in more detail, but to summarize the main points: cross-validation randomly divides our sample we employed for the baseline model into four segments. We use three segments to estimate the parameters, while the fourth, 'test-set' segment (Ward et al. -of-Sample Forecast: 2017-50 We begin by summarizing the underlying model we use for the forecast. In light of the previous sections, this model is fully based on Model 1 in Table 2 [ Figure 4 here]
Out
We also calculated the predicted values for each of the five current or potential candidate states individually, see Figure 4 . 16 The horizontal solid line in these country panels pertains to a reasonable benchmark we set for 'sufficiently high' compliance.
Specifically, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004, 666) acknowledge that the EU might undermine the credibility of its own conditionality if it admits candidates at different levels of preparedness. Testimonies of accession negotiators and coordinators point out that enlargement decisions have been considered for a group of countries as a whole, e.g., the Baltic States or the Visegrad countries rather than for each state individually (see Vassiliou 2007) . As a result, particular groups may join the EU when there is a sufficiently large number of candidates who show good compliance (Christoffersen 2007, 32f) . We thus assume that all states entering the EU in 2004 (1) had achieved more or less the same level of 'preparedness' so that they could jointly assume membership and (2) that this joint level of compliance was also sufficiently high. We, therefore, use the average level of compliance with EU law of all states that joined the EU in 2004 as a benchmark value for future accessions -this benchmark lies at 0.733, according to our data. 17 Again, though, recall that this forecasts states' ability to comply with the acquis, not their willingness and we do not 16 Confidence intervals omitted for the presentation of the point estimates.
17 In addition, the number of countries that joined the EU in 2004 is significantly larger than those that joined in later accession rounds. Thus, focusing on the 2004 accession round as a benchmark is based on more data points, which lowers measurement error to some degree. predict actual accession dates (but years in which candidate states might, in principle, be able to comply with EU law).
Several important conclusions can be derived from Figure 4 . First, the high prediction power we identified in our model in the previous sections remains to be given. This is illustrated by comparing the predicted and 'real ' values in 1998-2016 (upper-left panel) . Second, overall ability to comply with EU law is supposed to increase over time, regardless of which scenario we look at. Third, and most interestingly, compliance ability varies substantially by country. Despite this variation, though, only one of the current and potential EU candidates seems to be 
Conclusion
Candidates for EU membership are required to adjust domestic legislation prior to accession for bringing their laws, regulations, and administrative practices in line with the acquis communautaire. Knowing in advance which of the (potential) current candidate states are less able to abide by EU regulations over the course of accession is not only of academic interest, but also essential to the EU's monitoring and enforcement schemes as well as an informed public debate about future EU enlargement. Yet, thus far, we have known relatively little about the actual accession prospects of current candidate countries, in particular how their compliance ability may develop over the years to come. Previous empirical testing is primarily of an expost nature and, hence, merely accounts for compliance patterns in the past. We sought to take research on candidates' compliance with the EU accession rules one step further by moving from ex-post analysis to predictions and forecasts about likely future compliance.
We specified a model to predict the ability to comply with the EU acquis of potential and current candidate countries based on proxies for adjustment costs and administrative capacities, and for which we have observations back to 1998 and projections up to 2050. We used in-sample and out-of-sample techniques to assess the predictive power of that model, before providing out-of-sample forecasts of candidates' compliance with EU law in 2017-50. Our research finds that the empirical model can accurately predict candidate state compliance ability, and it emphasizes that only one country of the current and potential EU candidates seems to be able to sufficiently comply with the accession criteria until 2023: FYR Macedonia. Albania or Bosnia-Herzegovina may even face problems in their ability to comply with EU law sufficiently before 2050. These figures appear to lower expectations of further enlargement any time soon. That said, they may still paint a 'too optimistic' picture and the actual future compliance levels of the individual candidate states could well be even weaker than suggested, as our model seems to slightly under-predict compliance rates toward the end of the observation period in Figure 4 .
Note that our predictions are based on some partly restrictive assumptions, e.g., that the forecasts for our exogenous predictors turn out to be correct, that the past relationship between our predictors and the probability of EU compliance will continue to hold in the future, and note that we cannot account for random events or states' unwillingness to comply in the future, even if they could, such as the current AKP government in Turkey (see also Hegre et al. 2013) . We conclude, nevertheless, that 'theoretically derived factors that are consistently associated with better predictions should increase the researcher's confidence about their substantive meaningfulness' (Hegre et al. 2017, 116) . In fact, assessing the predictive power of empirical models and forecasting state behavior in the future have important implications for theory development and can offer significant benefits for policymakers to foresee candidates' compliance with EU law more accurately. Our study is informative in terms of effectively allocating resources within the EU. That is, the findings strongly suggest that more efforts are necessary if the EU wants better compliance with its rules and regulations for potential member states. What is more, if no political decision will be taken favouring early enlargement despite candidates' non-compliance, our finding that -except for FYR Macedonia -new states are unlikely to be able to join within the next ten years may help to take some heat of the current enlargement debate, which often makes believe that further enlargement is lurking around the next corner. Böhmelt and Freyburg (2013) , and Model 4 in Böhmelt and Freyburg (2015) .
